hello.I'm a professor of moral and political philosophy at the University of Vienna.
I work in moral philosophy, epistemology, and feminist philosophy. Before coming to Vienna, I spent 9 years at the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Cambridge. I received my PhD from MIT in 2012. Before that I read Physics & Philosophy at Balliol College in Oxford. When not doing philosophy, I like to sing, run, and eat. I also like this guy. You can find my CV here. |
Copyright Uni Wien/Joseph Krpelan
|
Research
Here are some of my current projects:
I am working on a book about moral understanding. It's aim is to figure out what moral understanding it, how we can acquire it, and how we can share it with others. Lately, I have been particularly interested in what kind of questions we need to ask in order to expand our moral understanding. I have argued that there is a kind of moral inquiry – hermeneutical inquiry – which aims at making sense of our moral situation. My paper "Changing Minds and Hearts" has been awarded the 2023 Marc Sanders Prize in Metaethics.
A second project is on our practices of moral responsibility. What do we do when we take responsibility for having acted wrongly? Can moral ignorance excuse? What is an excuse, anyway? What's the point of apologising?
A third project is a collaboration with Tom McClelland. We have been thinking about how the notion of affordance perception – that is, the idea that we perceive opportunities for action – can help us make progress on a number of questions in feminist philosophy. We have argued that affordance perception can contribute to inequalities in labour division. More recently, we have been thinking about objectification.
I am also interested in the nature and ethics of labour and labour division. Together with Arathi Sriprakash, Tyler Denmead, and Ella Whiteley, I have thought about labour in the academy.
I also like to think about philosophy of mind, (regular) epistemology, moral psychology, and philosophy of physics.
I am working on a book about moral understanding. It's aim is to figure out what moral understanding it, how we can acquire it, and how we can share it with others. Lately, I have been particularly interested in what kind of questions we need to ask in order to expand our moral understanding. I have argued that there is a kind of moral inquiry – hermeneutical inquiry – which aims at making sense of our moral situation. My paper "Changing Minds and Hearts" has been awarded the 2023 Marc Sanders Prize in Metaethics.
A second project is on our practices of moral responsibility. What do we do when we take responsibility for having acted wrongly? Can moral ignorance excuse? What is an excuse, anyway? What's the point of apologising?
A third project is a collaboration with Tom McClelland. We have been thinking about how the notion of affordance perception – that is, the idea that we perceive opportunities for action – can help us make progress on a number of questions in feminist philosophy. We have argued that affordance perception can contribute to inequalities in labour division. More recently, we have been thinking about objectification.
I am also interested in the nature and ethics of labour and labour division. Together with Arathi Sriprakash, Tyler Denmead, and Ella Whiteley, I have thought about labour in the academy.
I also like to think about philosophy of mind, (regular) epistemology, moral psychology, and philosophy of physics.
Papers
In Progress:
Telling Right from Wrong: Moral Testimony and Moral Knowledge.
Book manuscript under contract with OUP.
Blaming the Victim.
Apologies: An Anatomy.
Objectification and Affordance Perception. With Tom McClelland.
Published and Forthcoming:
Changing Minds and Hearts (Winner of Marc Sanders Prize in Metaethics).
Forthcoming in Shafer-Landau, Ross (Ed.) Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford University Press
Taking Responsibility.
Forthcoming in Chang, Ruth and Srinivasan, Amia (Eds). Conversations in Philosophy, Law, and Politics. Oxford University Press.
Gendered Affordance Perception and Unequal Domestic Labour. With Tom McClelland.
Forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
We have written a piece for a general audience based on this paper: "Men often don’t see mess like women do – changing that could make housework more equal." The Conversation.
Reverse-Engineering Blame.
Philosophical Perspectives 33 (1):200-219. (Published version here.)
The Power of Excuses.
Philosophy and Public Affairs. Online First, July 2019. (Published version here.)
Excuse without Exculpation: The Case of Moral Ignorance.
In Shafer-Landau, Russ (ed.) Oxford Studies in Metaethics. pp. 72-95. 2020
Faith and Know How.
In Benton, Matthew, Hawthorne, John & Rabinowitz, Dani (eds.) Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
Moral Understanding as Knowing Right from Wrong.
Ethics 127 (3):521-552. (Published version here)
Featured at PeaSoup with Précis by Kieran Setiya.
On Knowing What's Right and Being Responsible (Draft).
In Robichaud, Philip and Wieland, Jan Willam (eds.) Responsibility: The Epistemic Condition. Oxford University Press.
Moral Knowledge and Moral Worth.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (2):393-418. (Published version here)
Respecting All the Evidence (with Sophie Horowitz).
Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2835-2858. (Published version here)
Expecting the Unexpected (with Tom Dougherty and Sophie Horowitz).
Res Philosophica 92 (2):301-321. (Published version here)
Understanding and Knowing.
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (1pt1):57-74. (Published version here)
Praise without Perfection: A Dilemma for Right-making Reasons.
American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (2). (Published version here)
In Defense of Moral Testimony.
Philosophical Studies vol. 158 no. 2 (2012): 175-195. (Published version here)
Telling Right from Wrong: Moral Testimony and Moral Knowledge.
Book manuscript under contract with OUP.
Blaming the Victim.
Apologies: An Anatomy.
Objectification and Affordance Perception. With Tom McClelland.
Published and Forthcoming:
Changing Minds and Hearts (Winner of Marc Sanders Prize in Metaethics).
Forthcoming in Shafer-Landau, Ross (Ed.) Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford University Press
Taking Responsibility.
Forthcoming in Chang, Ruth and Srinivasan, Amia (Eds). Conversations in Philosophy, Law, and Politics. Oxford University Press.
Gendered Affordance Perception and Unequal Domestic Labour. With Tom McClelland.
Forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
We have written a piece for a general audience based on this paper: "Men often don’t see mess like women do – changing that could make housework more equal." The Conversation.
Reverse-Engineering Blame.
Philosophical Perspectives 33 (1):200-219. (Published version here.)
The Power of Excuses.
Philosophy and Public Affairs. Online First, July 2019. (Published version here.)
Excuse without Exculpation: The Case of Moral Ignorance.
In Shafer-Landau, Russ (ed.) Oxford Studies in Metaethics. pp. 72-95. 2020
Faith and Know How.
In Benton, Matthew, Hawthorne, John & Rabinowitz, Dani (eds.) Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
Moral Understanding as Knowing Right from Wrong.
Ethics 127 (3):521-552. (Published version here)
Featured at PeaSoup with Précis by Kieran Setiya.
On Knowing What's Right and Being Responsible (Draft).
In Robichaud, Philip and Wieland, Jan Willam (eds.) Responsibility: The Epistemic Condition. Oxford University Press.
Moral Knowledge and Moral Worth.
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (2):393-418. (Published version here)
Respecting All the Evidence (with Sophie Horowitz).
Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2835-2858. (Published version here)
Expecting the Unexpected (with Tom Dougherty and Sophie Horowitz).
Res Philosophica 92 (2):301-321. (Published version here)
Understanding and Knowing.
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (1pt1):57-74. (Published version here)
Praise without Perfection: A Dilemma for Right-making Reasons.
American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (2). (Published version here)
In Defense of Moral Testimony.
Philosophical Studies vol. 158 no. 2 (2012): 175-195. (Published version here)
paulina sliwa : institute of philosophy : university of vienna : Paulina.sliwa at univie dot ac dot at
